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This paper contributes to empirical research on international environmental institutions
by introducing a new dataset of national positions at the UN Framework Convention
for Climate Change (UNFCCC). The observations cover more than 90 countries on
two historical moments of climate change decision making: the pre-Kyoto Protocol
enforcement phase (2001-04) and the post-Kyoto Protocol meetings (2008-11). The
data is retrieved from official UNFCCC documents and National Communications,
and was collected by means of two measurement strategies: a qualitative (dictionary–
based) content analysis, and a frequentist analysis based on Wordfish. By describing
and comparing the original data, this paper offers a “map” of national preferences at
the climate negotiations. Moreover, it proposes a discussion on the dimensionality of
the conflict over climate policies and the salience that countries attach to them.
1 Introduction
Students of international organizations are increasingly interested in explaining the dynam-
ics of the climate negotiations with formal bargaining analysis (Hovi and Areklett, 2004;
Pittel and Rübbelke, 2008; Ward et al., 2001). Unfortunately, however, the literature on
international climate policy does not offer a bridge between the underpinnings of bargaining
theory and empirical observations. Works on the UNFCCC then face a problem identified
in other areas of political science: featuring “partial post hoc explanations” and lacking the
“ingredients needed for an informed prediction” (Haas, 1990, p. 6-7).
Prominent scholars have long raised concerns with the scarcity of data on climate change
decision making (Bernauer, 1995; Sprinz, 2004). Today, research is still at the beginning of
the “long road of cumulative knowledge on environmental institutions” (Breitmeier et al.,
2006, p. 9). Questions over the comprehensiveness of policies and the distributional conflict
around climate change agreements call for empirical answers, and yet virtually no systematic
information is available to take over this type of analysis. In addressing this problem, I will
now present two original datasets collected to fill this gap.
The data described in this paper refers to two bargaining rounds, namely the pre–
Kyoto Protocol enforcement negotiations and the post–Kyoto Protocol negotiations. More
substantively, the coded variables delineate the issue space of the climate negotiations and
identify agreements, disagreements, countries’ ideal positions and saliences at the UNFCCC.
The goal is to match theories of international climate cooperation to real–world information.
Thus, the data gathering endeavour is inspired by works that establish an exchange between
theory and empirics in other bargaining spheres – e.g., Mansfield et al. (2000) for interna-
tional trade, and Thomson et al. (2006) for EU legislation.
The paper is structured as follows: First, I summarize how the literature has empirically
investigated international positions at the UNFCCC. I highlight the gaps in the applied re-
search and point to the opportunities that large–N data presents for a comprehensive study
of the international climate negotiations. Second, I describe the way I collected the UNFCCC
information. This is based on content analysis and builds upon spatial measurements of bar-
gaining positions. I then present the data points for the issue-specific national positions and
identify their underlying dimensions, therefore exploring width and depth of the positional
data. Finally, I present an alternative dataset drawn on the same texts, but with quanti-
tative content analysis. I conclude by wrapping up the efforts to delineate the bargaining
space of the UNFCCC.
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2 Measuring climate bargaining positions
Studies of the UNFCCC negotiations have benefited from model building and theory de-
velopment in economics (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 2003) and political science
(Grundig, 2006; Ward et al., 2001; Hovi, 2001). However, the implications of these stud-
ies are sometimes elusive, because of their restrained empirical capacity. Taking a critical
perspective on the works so far, I argue that research on the climate negotiations risks “stag-
nating” over empirical deficiencies. In what follows I concentrate on two main limitations:
the weak link between climate policy research and spatial measurements of bargaining, and
the predominance of “small” data.
The first limitation is revealed by the little attention that climate policy students have
so far paid to the spatial analysis of political competition (Downs, 1957; Hinich and Munger,
1997). Researchers of international organizations (e.g. the EU) have long focused on spa-
tial measures to generate empirical estimates of international negotiations (see, for instance,
Tsebelis, 1999). Accordingly, a negotiation agreement (O) is one point in a spectrum of
possible outcomes (i.e. the bargaining set). This is determined by the distance between the
status quo of the previous agreement (d) and the ideal position (xi) of bargaining actors
(i = 1, 2, ..., n). The latter can be additionally weighted by the importance (i.e. salience)
that each attaches to the negotiation. Figure 1 illustrates these elements over one single
issue (j).
In its simplest form, the spatial framework describes variation over a continuum. This
allows researchers to compute distances across points on a line, therefore quickly calculating
how far the agreement is from the status quo, and how successful a given country is in pulling
the agreement close to its position. In addition, the usefulness of spatial measurements lies
in the possibility of disentangling the negotiated issues (e.g., j 6= z), or otherwise overlapping
them into one unique dimension.
Figure 1: Spatial illustration of bargaining elements
-
d x1 O x2
j
Spatial analysis has delivered important empirical information regarding several bar-
gaining endeavours, from domestic coalitions (Boekhoon et al., 2006; Morgan and Schwebach,
2
1995) to international negotiations (Bueno De Mesquita, 2004; Schneider, 2005; Odell and
Sell, 2006; Hug and König, 2002). And yet, this understanding has not been fully integrated
in the empirical analysis of the UNFCCC. Researchers of climate change bargaining have
not often used this setup to draw data, thereby missing the opportunity of framing their
information on simple and intuitive scales.
The second limitation is the custom of analyzing restricted numbers of countries or is-
sues. Some authors work around the complexity of the UN climate negotiations by referring
to a small set of parties instead of the global sample. This approach may be helpful for
theoretical propositions over few ideal countries (Hovi and Areklett, 2004). However, the
inferences can hardly be translated into real world judgments (as also acknowledged in Bar-
rett, 1999). By contrast, other researchers choose to shrink the number of issues in order to
simplify the analysis of a large N of actors (Grundig, 2006; Ward et al., 2001). This custom
levels the facets of the negotiation agenda, and possibly compromises the diversity of the
bargained issues.
These simplifications occur in both quantitative and qualitative camps of climate nego-
tiations studies (see review in Sprinz, 2004). Even if econometric techniques have improved
the feasibility of statistical inferences from small samples, quantitative researchers have con-
tinued preferring the analysis of single topics of UNFCCC bargaining. For instance, Jensen
and Spoon (2011) focus on long-term emission reduction targets, while Lange et al. (2007) in-
vestigate only the issue of equity and “differentiated responsibility”. This form of ‘shrinkage’
is also reinforced by the fact that the majority of studies on climate change negotiations still
resides in qualitative research. Case-studies have protracted the “one-issue, one-country”
exploration of the UNFCCC (e.g. Bang et al., 2005; Levy and Egan, 2003), at the cost of
discounting the general implications of their conclusions.
One exception of climate research aimed at gathering spatially delineated data in a
large–sample fashion is the “Negotiating Climate Change” project led by the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology and University of Zurich (Weiler, 2012, but see also Bailer, 2012 and
Castro et al., 2011). This is data collected from an expert survey conducted at the UNFCCC
conferences, and complemented with the coding of sparse national documents presented at
the Kyoto Protocol Ad-Hoc Working Groups. The information includes 56 national positions
on eight theoretically-derived policy issues. The period under analysis is the negotiations
between 2009 and 2010, which coincided with the beginning of the second phase of the
Kyoto Protocol. Substantiating these national positions, the dataset also presents salience
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values. These are the fraction of countries’ statements on the selected issues as reported by
the UNFCCC watchdog, the “Earth Negotiation Bulletin” (for a description of the ENB’s
monitoring role, see Chasek, 2001).
While this data gathering is certainly relevant for a broad delineation of climate change
bargaining, some information remains unclear. First, it is left unexplained why the nego-
tiations are proxied as a bargaining between the selected 56 countries. In other words, it
is not specified in what terms this sample is representative of the real-world negotiations.
It is also not clear to what extent the data generating process described in Weiler (2012)
is homogeneous. While the positions are drawn from interviews with members of national
delegations, the saliencies are generated from reports written by a third party (the ENB).
This may be problematic because the positions are provided by a different source compared
to the salience estimates, and it raises the concern that the two types of information may
not exactly validate each other (Odell, 2002).
Another problem is that the position data is collected in two years (2009 and 2010) that
only partially overlap with the data source for salience (ENB for 2007-2009). While this can
be justified if positions and salience do not vary much throughout the years, the evolution
of bargaining across time is not really addressed. This leads to a third critique, regarding
issue selection and dimensionality: the eight issues in this dataset were identified based on
previous knowledge of climate experts, which is of course a reliable approach for issue iden-
tification. However, Weiler (2012) does not address whether the data does support such
distinction, or whether the delegates may actually think of the issues as in “bundles”. The
EU literature suggests that inductive approaches to issue identification may reject theoretical
determinations of the bargaining space. Accordingly, factor analysis or related techniques
should be considered to investigate the latent dimensions of the data (Hix and Crombez,
2005).
Based on the lessons from the mentioned literature and the gaps identified in the climate
change research, I contribute to the empirical exploration of these negotiations by proposing
new original data framed as the spatial parameters of bargaining. In what follows I first
present the criteria that precede the data gathering, and then I illustrate the actual data.
3 The data sources
The main reason why little work has been undertaken to collect large–scale information on
the ongoing climate negotiations is the cost of generating such data (see Achen, 2006, for an
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equivalent statement regarding EU bargaining). Weiler (2012) and Weiler and Bailer (2011)
successfully face this challenge, but with the arguable shortcomings I have pointed out.
To enrich and possibly strengthen the data collection initiated on this front, I focus on
different information on the UNFCCC. The data source should grant absolute uniformity
between countries’ positions and salience, in that it should provide both values simultane-
ously. Moreover, not only should the data be generated by the countries that negotiate at
the UNFCCC, but it should at the same time be derived from the decision making process.
Ultimately, I seek to embed this information in a spatial understanding of bargaining. This
means that the data should be framed in a spatial spectrum (say, j) that includes each single
country’s position (xij) as well as the collective agreement (Oj) and the reference point (dj).
The most cost-effective sources of bargaining data are texts generated in the negotia-
tion process. As the evidence of policy (or political) preferences can be found in “content
originated within an environment of collective associative memory” (Krippendorff, 2004, p.
14), I can rely on documents produced for and within the UNFCCC as a reliable mirror
of bargaining interests. However, differently from Weiler and colleagues, I use content that
countries must submit within the UNFCCC.1 This boils down to the selection of two types of
documents. On the one hand I collect “decision–level texts”, which represent the resolutions
that the international community agrees upon at two different points in time (i.e. an earlier
document for the status quo, d, and a later document for the outcome, O). On the other
hand, I identify “country–level texts”, which carry information on countries’ positions (x) –
and saliences (s) – on the negotiated issues.
3.1 Decision-level texts
Law-making at the United Nations, as in other international bodies such as the World Trade
Organization or the European Commission, is grounded on the practice of member states
collectively adopting a text (Franchino and Mariotto, 2013; Odell and Sell, 2006). Decision
making documents are most often written in recommendatory language, for the subsequent
conduct of the countries is what actually determines the enforcement of international law.
Yet still, they represent a major condition for the creation of global standards and inter-
national treaties (Schachter, 1994; Kaufmann, 1980). Not for nothing writing these texts
1This is important because it prevents from not–at–random missingness. Broadly speaking, it does not
matter if positions are sincere or strategic. Surely part of the bargaining can take place elsewhere, e.g. in
the coalition meetings before the observed negotiation rounds. However, as I am focusing only on the “real”
negotiations between the positions expressed, the fact that they are compulsory is relevant.
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is preceded by long-lasting diplomatic discussions meant to allocate and address national
interests at the drafting table (Lax and Sebenius, 1986, p. 177-8).
The UN negotiating documents are usually shaped in the course of meetings preceding
the convenance of the assembly. In the case of the UNFCCC, each finalized draft goes to
the Conference of the Parties (COP), which is the supreme body of the Convention (Brun-
nee, 2002). The rule of vote is consensus.2 The text of the Convention presents clauses
for amendment, which allow any Party to raise the case against specific decisions. While
amendments can be brought to vote, the UNFCCC tradition is to discuss national concerns
while drafting a new agreement (Hey, 2001).
Decision making texts have been produced at any official meeting of the UNFCCC since
1992. While today many official events fill the negotiations’ calendar (e.g. Adaptation Fund
Board sessions, meetings of the Least Developed Countries expert group, among others),
two types of gatherings represent the core of the text–drafting process: the meeting of the
UNFCCC subsidiary bodies occurring in midyear; and the COP in conjunction with the
subsidiary bodies, which occurs at the end of each year. At both conferences all parties can
review the implementation of the Convention and, since 1997, assess the Kyoto Protocol
practices and adopt further resolutions (Boyd et al., 2008).
The selection of the decision–level texts for the data gathering is then linked to the
choice of the years that determine the status quo (d) and the outcome (O) of my dataset.
A logical strategy is choosing the negotiation points between two end-of-the-year meetings,
making the earlier text the status quo, and the younger text the outcome. However, at the
UNFCCC not every single session concludes with a significantly different agreement from
the previous year, because the negotiations have rather progressed in phases (Gupta, 2010).
It is then worth focusing on a range of years, in order to study a negotiation “window” that
shows variance of agreements, as the EU decision making research suggests (Hug and König,
2002).
Figure 2 shows the stepping stones of the history of the UNFCCC negotiations and
identifies the blocks of negotiations worth analyzing. The years between 1992 and 1997 con-
stitute the time in which national positions where first articulated (Bodansky, 2001). As
interactions in this period were fully heuristic, data for this period may be rather incoherent.
A more useful moment corresponds to the negotiation rounds between the meeting in
Marrakech (2001) and the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period (2005). This time pre-
2A special provision for failed consensual agreement exists, but the UNFCCC has never relied on it.
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Figure 2: Time line of UNFCCC events
sented a new paradigm for climate change policy, because it shifted the international focus
from the definition of ‘engagement’ to the concretization of commitment (Gupta, 2010, p.
646). These UNFCCC meetings also reflected a new type of diplomacy, featuring many
draft proposals from countries interested in shaping the outcome of what was perceived as
an important international contract (Boyd et al., 2008).
Similarly, but later in the negotiations’ history, the period between the establishment
of the Bali Roadmap (2008) and the Durban meeting (2011) represent an important negotia-
tion round. During these more recent years new bargaining issues emerged that more closely
involved developing countries. At the same time, the financial crisis just erupted, which
raised concerns with the design of the Convention and the distribution of responsibilities
(Gupta, 2010).
Based on such considerations, my data collection focuses on these two highlighted pe-
riods of UNFCCC bargaining. I call these the pre–Kyoto Protocol enforcement negotiations,
which span between the Bonn conference in the summer of 2001 (COP06)3 and the Proto-
col enforcement established in Buenos Aires in 2004 (COP10); and the post–Kyoto Protocol
negotiations, which go from the Poznan negotiations in 2008 (COP14) to the Durban agree-
ment in 2011 (COP17). The COP06 and COP14 agreement texts represent the status quo
points for the two bargaining periods. The COP10 and COP17 agreement documents, by
contrast, provide the two respective outcomes.
3I am here referring to the mid-year Bonn meeting in July 2001, which for several special circumstances
represented a true full convention (Dessai, 2001).
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3.2 Country-level texts
In terms of country-specific texts, several types of documents exist within the context of the
UN climate negotiations (see UNFCCC, 2012b). For part of their data collection, Weiler
and colleagues make use of submissions by countries (or, in some cases, coalitions) willing to
express a certain position on any of the issues dealt by the Ad-Hoc Working Groups of the
Convention. These documents are written in the same form of national position papers at the
EU, and therefore easily convey national stances on specific topics. However, the problems
with such texts are two: first, they are not obligatory, and many countries never wrote any;
second, they are open to any issue a country wants to state a position on, therefore allowing
for issue discrimination. These two aspects pose the problem of missing observations across
countries as well as issues. Besides, these documents have only started being a practice since
2007. I therefore dismiss their usefulness for my data gathering.
I identify the National Reports to the UNFCCC (or National Communications, from
here on NCs) as codable texts that countries involved at the negotiations produced in the
years under analysis. The NC is a document that each member country must submit to the
COP in order to meet commitments under the Convention. The core elements are “informa-
tion on emissions and removals of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and details of the activities a
Party undertakes to implement the Convention” (UNFCCC, 2012a). These texts must then
be anchored to the preferences that underline national bargaining behavior at the UNFCCC
meetings. Moreover, the reports “contain information on national circumstances, vulnera-
bility assessment, financial resources, and transfer of technology” (UNFCCC, 2012a). By
consequence, NCs are bound to inform and discuss explicitly debated topics of the COP
meetings.
I collect the reports that were issued by both developed and developing countries in the
years that correspond to the two bargaining periods. These are divided by countries listed
under the Annex I of the convention and the otherwise called Non–Annex I countries. The
available texts happen to be issued in years in which a new round of NCs was announced.
The use of the National Reports as sources of positions data, however, comes with certain
caveats.
First, these documents do not constitute simple position papers. NCs in fact agglomer-
ate different types of information, from climate science to economic predictions. This entails
a certain likelihood that the texts may be too technical, or that the political content may
be neutralized by “noise”. This is not necessarily a problem for the sake of comparing more
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or less similar content, generally. In any case, I work around this concern by relying on
the origin of the NC. Each NC is in fact submitted and published by the Ministry of the
Environment (or its national equivalent). Thus, if the climate change negotiations are indeed
political as the political science literature has argued so far (Gupta and Grubb, 2000; Ott
et al., 2008), the latent ‘seabed’ of the stream of language in the NCs should also be political
to some significant level. This is also in line with the theory that positions are never fully
observed on their true dimensions (Lake and Powell, 1999), and that researchers have only
access to noisy indicators (Benoit and Laver, 2012).
The second caveat derives from the fact that “the required contents of National Com-
munications and the timetable for their submission are different for Annex I and Non-Annex
I Parties” (UNFCCC, 2012b). This may compromise the comparability of the information
conveyed by the groups of countries. However, a look at the official Reporting Guidelines
shows that the risk of evaluating completely different texts is low: the Annex I reports “in-
form on ongoing policies”, and Non-Annex I reports similarly “cover legislative and executive
efforts” (Ellis et al., 2010). In addition, the NC platforms for Non-Annex I countries present
a section for “other information deemed relevant to report to the international community”,
allowing them to address bargaining positions on all discussed issues.4
The final challenge is that the frequency of the NC submissions is not exactly congru-
ent between the two groups. Annex I countries are required to submit their reports every
three to five years. Non-Annex I countries instead submit an initial NC within three years
of becoming a Party to the UNFCCC, and then within two to three years from when the
following NC is announced (Ellis et al., 2010). This may be a problem if the submission
period of Annex I countries does not coincide with the submission period of Non-Annex I
countries for the years 2001-04 and 2008-11.
The inspection of the submissions available on the UNFCCC website5 shows that this
is not problematic: of the 192 member countries, 89 submitted their respective NCs in the
years preceding the Kyoto Protocol enforcement (corresponding to the NC3 for Annex I and
NC1 for Non–Annex I), while 84 submitted their next NC in the post–Kyoto Protocol ne-
gotiations period (corresponding to NC5 for Annex I and NC2 for Non–Annex I). In Figure
3 I list the texts from which I draw the ideal positions (and saliences).6
4http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/_guidelines_for_ai_nat_comm/items/2707.php.
5http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php
6The mentioned NCs are in English, French or Spanish. Ukraine and Russia submitted NCs in 2010, but
only in Russian. Since I do not have access to Russian speaking assistants, I do not include them.
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4 Manual content analysis
The two types of texts from which I collect the observations on the UNFCCC were presented
in the previous section. In this section I first describe the bargaining issues included in the
dataset, and then proceed to the description of the issue scaling and data collection. Lastly
I summarize features and characteristics of the data.
4.1 Identification of the issues
Issues constitute a most crucial component of bargaining studies. Not only do they represent
the ‘what’ around which the negotiations evolve, but they also establish the spectrum over
which countries vary with respect to their preferences (Hovi et al., 2009, p. 29-31). In the
decision making space, the scale of a negotiated issue delimits the range of possible national
and collective positions. The scaling measurement is also of major importance, as it shows
the way countries perceive the bargaining, and therefore on what kind of intervals the pos-
sible reachable outcomes exist. Last but not least, issues inform, confirm, and disentangle
the dimensions of a negotiation.
A data gathering procedure that aims at generating reliable information on the UN-
FCCC must extract the true issues at the backbone of these negotiations. These are often
deeply embedded in the bargaining discourse, and yet they should be known and acknowl-
edged by all players. In the climate change case, both decision–level and country–level texts
are assumed to carry information on the underlying issues at the COPs. The question is,
then, what criteria to follow in order to systematically identify the bargaining issues.
Empirical studies on EU decision making usually rely on self-evident issues. These can
be raised on an agenda-rolling basis in the course of a European Parliament meeting (Krep-
pel and Tsebelis, 1995), or are advanced in the form of separate proposals at the Commission
(Thomson et al., 2006). This type of issue identification is highly practical for legislative
data, as all issues are explicit and known (‘issues’ are also called as such, and are associated
with a specific number and code). However, this is not directly comparable to the UNFCCC:
while here too the specific decisions in the agreement texts are assigned an identifiable num-
ber, they are not reported accordingly, therefore they are not quite as self-evident as in the
EU. Nor are the issues directly linked to the sections (or chapters) of the NCs, which follow
a different structure.
This leads to a bifurcation of strategies for the identification of issues at the UNFCCC.
On the one side I can rely on induction. I call this a topic approach, by which I mean
11
the extraction of issues based on the cross–validation of topics. On the other I can use a
word–based approach, which detects issues based on the texts’ key–words. In the interest of
identifying agenda points with the highest level of validity, I engage in both approaches.
Table 1: Issues and scales
Period 1 Period 2
Issue Scale Issue Scale
1. CDM engagement Ordinal 1. CDM engagement Ordinal
2. Emission trading Ordinal 2. Emission trading Ordinal
3. Binding commitment Ordinal 3. Binding commitment Ordinal
4. LUCF accounting Ordinal 4. LUCF historical records Ordinal
5. Funding approach Ordinal 5. Funding approach Ordinal
6. Abatement credits Ordinal 6. Abatement credits Ordinal
7. LUCF eligible threshold Ordinal 7. REDD eligible threshold Ordinal
8. Nuclear energy use Ordinal 8. Nuclear energy use Ordinal
9. Technological transfers Ordinal 9. CCS adoption Ordinal
10. Adaptation support Continuous 10. Adaptation support Continuous
11. LUCF–based abatement Continuous 11. Technological transfers Continuous
12. GHG abatement target Continuous 12. GHG abatement target Continuous
13. Int’l accountability Continuous 13. Int’l accountability Continuous
14. Legislative action level Continuous 14. Legislative action level Continuous
15. Offset projects credit Continuous 15. Offset projects credit Continuous
16. Regulatory approach Continuous 16. Regulatory approach Continuous
17. Systematic observation Continuous 17. Systematic observation Continuous
18. Historical responsibility Binary 18. Historical responsibility Binary
19. ODA diversion Binary 19. ODA diversion Binary
20. Supplementarity Binary 20. Supplementarity Binary
21. Proportional industry impact Binary 21. Temperature rise limit Ordinal
22. Uncertainty of policy Binary 22. Post–2012 regime Ordinal
23. Int’l bunkers Ordinal
4.2 Issue scaling and data collection
As the identification and validation of issues is completed, I now proceed to describing the
data. After collecting the texts and cleaning them from figures and tables, the coding is
performed in three main steps. The first task is determining the unit of text to code. The
content analysis literature points to two possibilities, namely the options of “quasi sentences”
(Budge et al., 2001) and “natural sentences” (Ray, 2001; Daubler et al., 2011). The choice
depends on the nature of the language at hand. The NCs, in fact, follow a ‘short paragraph’
writing style, featuring consistent spacings in between long sentences (see Table 1). The same
is true for the language in the agreement texts, which are sectioned in numbered paragraphs
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delimitated by punctuation marks (Daubler et al., 2011). In short, the natural sentence
seems a reliable unit of coding for the types of texts under analysis.
The second step is the assignment of text to the pre-determined issue categories. This
task is equivalent to the categorization of ‘quasi sentences’ in the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP) (Budge et al., 2001).7 However, the difference between the CMP texts and
the UNFCCC documents, and in particular the NCs, is remarkable. The size of the electoral
manifestos is fairly manageable and lend itself to coding the full texts with all sub-sections
(to mention one statistic, the 1992 UK Labour party manifesto is about 7,000 words). By
contrast, one NC can go up to 100,000 words (i.e. 340 pages). It is therefore unrealistic to
engage in parsimonious human coding that covers all the text of all country-level documents
in the sample.
I address this challenge by identifying the relevant subtext with word frequencies (Laver
et al., 2003; Benoit et al., 2009) and studying it with classical content analysis (Krippendorff,
2004). The strategy is the following: the text is parsed into units (i.e. periods or short
paragraphs), and I screen these to search for words that carry position–relevant (or, in the
case of decision–level texts, agreement–relevant) content. The screening is facilitated by
the issue-based dictionary previously described. Every time I find one of the terms in the
dictionaries, I isolate the text unit, and then I judge it as the reference to an issue or not.
In the case in which the text unit is indeed connected to an issue, I assign it to such issue.
If instead the text unit does not refer to the issue, reflecting some other topic that is not
relevant for this work, it is left uncoded.8 As in the CMP, issues are assumed to be mutually
exclusive, so that the same unit of text cannot be assigned to more than one issue category.
The third and final step is the assignment of positional value to each categorized unit
of text. This passage relies on the “scaling” of the issue spectrum. Defining such scale is
important because bargaining relies on transitive preferences, and coding positions would
not be useful if they were not put in a ranking order (Arrow, 1951). Moreover, the issue
metric allows for the numerical evaluation of the bargaining elements (Lowe et al., 2011).
Scales are necessarily deductive, because I cannot rely on a generalized distribution of all
positions. The UNFCCC issues in fact vary in the scaling of positional values: while some
7Although the CMP studies parties, the coding approach has migrated to the analysis of political discourse
in other decision making organisms (e.g. parliament speeches) with significant success (Laver and Benoit,
2002).
8Note that this type of coding does not rely on the sentence–by–sentence sequence. This is beneficial, for
it implies that coders’ priors do not affect the quality of the coding, and the generated values are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) (Benoit et al., 2012).
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issues can be defined as continuous (e.g. the percentages of emissions that each country
plans to mitigate with reforestation), others are best measured as a binary outcome (i.e.
yes/no for differentiated responsibility).
The criteria for defining the extreme and intermediate positional values are drawn
from the same sources used to identify the issues: the academic publications and the ENB
summaries. To understand how the positional values are pinpointed in their continuum, I go
back to the excerpts and scale the issue space based on these descriptions. For example, for
the “assignment of abatement units” (period 1) I measure three different positional values:
a low value for the more skeptic Australia, Japan and Canada; a higher value for the more
peremptory EU, G77/China and Samoa; and an intermediate value for Switzerland. The
measurement effort leads to scaling binary, ordinal, and continuous issues, and concludes the
manual coding of the UNFCCC documents. A better description is found in the Appendix.
Figure 4: Coded text by periods and issues
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The box plot displays the number of coded units of text for all issues by bargaining period. The dot plot compares the
number of coded units of text per each of the 17 issues that overlap in the two periods.
The content analysis generates information on the characteristics of the NCs as well as
the data on positions (x), outcomes (O) and disagreements (d) at the UNFCCC. Tables in
the Appendix summarize the country-level data. The changing nature of the issues across
negotiations is shown in Figure 4. The box plots in subfigure (a) indicate that the amount
of text for all coded issues increases from period 1 to period 2. In fact, while for period 1
the dataset reports an average of about 300 units coded per issue, for period 2 the coding
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produces an average of 600 units per issue. Analogously, subfigure (b) shows that some topics
receive a different degree of attention in the 2008–2011 NCs compared to the earlier ones.
For example, in 2008–2011 countries mentioned emission trading [issue 5] and international
climate funding [issue 14] twice as much as in the 2001–04 NCs. While this is known from
observational evidence, mine is the first large dataset that records this variation over time.9
Figure 5: Coded outcomes
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The plotted dots represent the values of the outcomes standardized to a scale between 0 and 1. The y–axis refers to the issues
in the dataset. The x–axis is the continuum of possible positions.
Finally, the manual coding generates specific information regarding the agreement
points. As Figure 5 illustrates, the locations of the bargaining outcomes also vary across is-
sues and time. Note that the spatial depiction lends itself to a comparison with the outcomes
in Weiler (2012). For example, his data also assigns a median value to the decision over in-
ternational funding [issue 14] at the post–Kyoto Protocol negotiations (Weiler and Bailer,
2011). However, the UNFCCC dataset introduced here additionally includes the value of
the agreements before 2005. My data then goes beyond any extant dataset in granting “long
and wide” information on climate agreements.
The descriptive statistics of the bargaining positions and international outcomes pro-
vide a snapshot of the UNFCCC dataset. The changing nature of the identified issues is
a crucial feature here. This variance offers important empirical substance, for example, for
9Weiler and Bailer (2011), for example, do have information on the repetition of issues on UNFCCC legal
texts, but only cover issues discussed at the 2009-10 negotiations.
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the study of changing bargaining strategies in the course of the negotiations. At the same
time, it justifies separating the analyses in different bargaining windows, as not all issues are
strictly comparable. In short, the data represents an important basis for the comparative
study of climate policy making and bargaining.
4.3 Dimensionality
The previous section described the manual coding of the two bargaining periods under anal-
ysis. Now I move to the exploration of the gathered information, in order to first assess how
this information reveals the dimensions underlying the negotiations.
The study of international negotiations traditionally relies on theoretical constructions
on what underlines bargaining conflict. EU scholars often assume that topics are rooted
in an integration dimension (Schneider and Cederman, 1994; Thomson et al., 2006; Krep-
pel and Tsebelis, 1995). Similarly, WTO research conceptualizes trade preferences on this
continuum (Milner and Rosendorff, 1997), although some call it the economic liberalization
dimension (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003). This theoretical understanding applies to climate
change negotiations too. Gupta (2012), for example, notes that despite the large number of
agenda issues at the UNFCCC, parties always refer back to general “multilateralism”. This
assumption, however, must be grounded on empirical confirmations. I therefore recur to the
exploration of dimensions in the UNFCCC dataset with latent variable modelling.
In the universe of data reduction models, factor analysis, which assumes the number of
latent variables to be smaller than the observations, is the most popular model. Factoriza-
tion has been used to induce the underlying dimensions of bargaining preferences (see, e.g.,
Hix and Crombez, 2005). And yet, the choice of the factoring specification needs a careful
assessment.
As the issue variables in the UNFCCC dataset are differently scaled, the latent con-
struct has both ordinal and continuous indicators. Accordingly, a “normal theory” factor
analysis may run into measurement problems, as discretizing continuous variables would lose
information, while slicing up discrete variables would complicate the estimation. A solution
is to accommodate these ordinal and continuous variables with a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm that adjusts for differences between components, and captures variation
between types of responses. I then use Quinn (2004)’s Bayesian mixed factor analysis algo-
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rithm, which models the variable:
x∗ij = Λφi + εi (1)
where Λ is a matrix of factor loadings, φi is the vector of factor scores, εi is the vector of
(normally distributed) disturbances, and x∗ij is the vector of latent responses associated with
the elements of X:
xij =
 x
∗
ij if j is continuous
c if x∗ij ∈ (γi(c−1), γjc) and j is ordinal
where j are the indexed responses, i are the observations, c is the categorical variable with
values (1, 2, ...Cj) that identifies whether a variable is ordinal, and γ is a collection of cut-
points that tend to infinity.
I first run a test that determines the likelihood that a fixed amount of factors is enough
to explain the data variance. The hypothesis that three factors are underlining the data fails
to be rejected for both periods (p > 0.07). Therefore, I perform the Bayesian mixed factor
analysis on three factors.10
Table 2 shows that the factors explain more than one third of the variance of the posi-
tions in both periods. In fact, including an extra factor only increases the explanatory power
of the factor analysis of 4 percent. The results are similar (and marginally stronger) if I ig-
nore the scaling differences and run a a principal component factor analysis with orthogonal
rotation. The alternative principal-components factoring is reported in the Appendix.
Table 2: Variance proportion of mixed factor analysis
Period 1 Variance Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 3.671 0.17 0.170
Factor 2 1.787 0.08 0.248
Factor 3 1.670 0.07 0.328
Period 2 Variance Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 3.914 0.17 0.170
Factor 2 1.720 0.07 0.244
Factor 3 1.364 0.05 0.305
H0 (1 factor): p = 0.00; H0 (2 factors): p = 0.02; H0 (3 factors): p = 0.07.
10The analysis was performed with the MCMCpack in R. For the loadings, see the Appendix.
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The rest of the topics that load on factor 1 (though less strongly) are issues such
as emission trading, differentiated responsibility, and international accountability. These
capture the rather ideological nature of the climate change debate, clustering issues dealing
with compliance at the UNFCCC. Following this interpretation, the climate negotiation
positions in my dataset are aligned on two axes: on the one hand these are positively
associated with issues related to integration and compliance; on the other, countries cluster
on issues related to the technicalities of climate mitigation (e.g. land use capacity and CCS).
The strong loadings on factor 1 are further supported by the scree test plots obtained
from the principal component factor analysis. Figure 6 shows that the eigenvalue of the
first component is noticeably higher than the rest. It is therefore safe to presume that this
measure captures the major latent variation at the UNFCCC.
Figure 6: Scree test plots from principal component factor analysis
0 5 10 15 20
Period 1
0 5 10 15 20
Period 2
In order to understand what this factorization implies for the distribution of the coun-
tries across the UNFCCC issues, Figure 7 plots country estimates of the latent scores (φ) of
factor 1. Empirical means and uncertainty bounds show an interesting pattern. For both
periods, most developed countries (e.g. Germany and Japan, in red in the figure) cluster on
the very upper end of the scale. By contrast, the least developed countries are located at
the low end of the plots, e.g. Madagascar and Nigeria (in green).
This posterior distribution can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, these es-
timates simply discriminate Annex I and Non Annex I countries, as these groups are strong
determinants of bargaining at the UNFCCC (see Castro et al., 2011). On the other hand,
18
they may distinguish countries that have truly different views of what the UNFCCC is about.
“Strong” countries, for example, use the negotiations to discuss international compliance and
leadership. “Weak” countries, by contrast, rarely miss the occasion to focus their speeches on
responsibility and aid. So, generally, factor 1 reveals conflict over commitment, integration,
but also redistribution at the UNFCCC.
Interestingly, note that in Figure 7 the empirical means close to zero (i.e. with little
association to either sides of the dimension) refer to countries like Brazil, China and India.
Accordingly, emerging powers seem to prefer moderate integration. This supports the qual-
itative observation that BASIC countries have had a role of “dynamic brokers” rather than
“nay sayers” at the climate change negotiations (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2012).
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5 Quantitative content analysis
The data generation described in the previous section has the benefit of having been super-
vised throughout the entire generation process. However, it comes with important trade offs:
beside a costly amount of time spent on coding, it assumes that issues are separate and ideal
positions are self–evident. If these assumptions did not hold, more inductive approaches to
preference estimation would be of better use.
Applied research in the past two decades has developed a range of semi- and fully au-
tomated techniques that help determining political actors’ ideal points based on frequentist
assumptions on words in texts. Some of these approaches are based on supervised learning,
such as Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003). Others represent unsupervised scaling methods,
from correspondence analysis (Greenacre, 2007) to expectation-maximization and multino-
mial choice models (Proksch and Slapin, 2008; Slapin and Proksch, 2008).
While all these methods are capable of extracting climate policy positions, the tech-
nique I use for the quantitative analysis of the UNFCCC documents is Wordfish.11 This
automated scaling program generates estimates of policy positions comparing the body of
different documents. The method has been applied to different text sources (manifestos,
speeches, statements, and pledges), measuring policy positions of individuals, parties, and
interests groups in different political settings (Klüver, 2009; Proksch and Slapin, 2010).
Compared to supervised methods such as Wordscores, the convenience of Wordfish re-
lies on the no–prior knowledge on the nature of the single texts (Benoit and Nulty, 2013).
Moreover, and especially when dealing with international texts, Wordfish is more generous
than nonparametric scaling approaches (Lowe et al., 2011). By sampling natural language
over words, nonparametric scaling requires the corpus of compared words to be absolutely
homogenous. However, this assumption is hardly applicable to the NCs.
Wordfish assumes that words’ frequencies provide information about the policy posi-
tion of each document with respect to others. The probability of each word appearing in a
given document is independent of the presence of others. Looking at the word frequencies
contained in each text, Wordfish determines the differences between alternative documents
by scaling them on a common (and singular) latent dimension. It is on this dimension that
the algorithm measures the documents’ relative policy positions.
Since words’ frequencies are expected to be generated from a counting stochastic pro-
11Note that I use quantitative text analysis only on NCs, as the agreement texts are too few for an accurate
estimation.
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cess, the algorithm assumes that words follow a Poisson distribution defined by the parameter
λ, which represents both the mean and the variance of the distribution. Applying this logic to
the distribution of words in the climate change texts, ideal position estimates are determined
as
yijt ∼ Poisson(λijt) (2)
where y measures how often the word j appears in the NC document i at each of the
bargaining period t. The parameter λ is determined by maximizing the following equation:
λijt = exp(αit + ψj + βj + ωit) (3)
where ω and α represent the period–specific document positions and fixed effects, respec-
tively, and β and ψ constitute the words’ parameter and their fixed effects. The coefficients
of interest here are the positions of the documents, ω, across a dimension that is up to the
researcher to interpret, and the word discrimination parameter, β, which corresponds to the
word placement along the latent dimension.
I run Wordfish on the NCs in order to determine national positions across the latent
unidimensional space. First, however, I explore the word coefficients, β, to understand what
type of dimension the algorithm captures from these texts.12 Figure 8 displays the words
parameters (β) for the first and second period. The y-axis reports the word fixed effect
(ψ), which is the logged mean count of each word across all the documents as measured by
Wordfish. By contrast, the x-axis distinguishes the distance across every single scaled word.
Common vocabulary in the corpus of the texts is supposed to load around the zero weight
value. It is then no surprise that non–discriminative words such as fund, and rainfall (period
1), and coastal and commitment (periods 2) are at the top of the word pyramid. Similarly,
note that Kyoto and carbon are quite high.
Moving to the discriminative words, in typical scaling exercises the fixed effects distribu-
tion is interpreted as the left–right dimension. However, it is hard to imagine that this scale
underlines the climate change negotiations. Rather, following the CMP subcategory system,
these should fall on a scale between pro–growth and pro–environment, or pro–integration
and anti–integration.
Figure 8 sheds light on the nature of the scaling. The words on the left side of the axis
12As other quantitative text analysis softwares, Wordfish works only with texts in the same language.
Hence, I keep the English documents and drop the French and Spanish ones. The Wordfish samples include
65 and 63 NCs for the 2001-04 and 2008-11 periods, respectively.
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in subfigure (a) are abysmal, level–rise, and phenomenal, among others. These words have
little to do with left–wing values, and are rather attributed to parties that are concerned
with loss of sovereignty and the uncertainty of climate change action. For example, in 2004
India writes that given “the abysmal consequences of climate change in the past decade,
India still needs resources to implement adaptation measures [...] despite significant and
increasing efforts at fortifying infrastructure and enhancing the preparedness to phenomenal
challenges in the recent decades” (India, NC 1, p. 229).
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The words that appear on the right end are instead development, assistance and Europe,
which are used by countries that link climate change to sustainable development, and that
associate Europe with climate leadership. For example, Germany in 2002 indicates that “the
Government’s development assistance policies are in keeping with the principle of sustainable
development. Cooperation in designing international agreements, and support for develop-
ing countries in implementation of such agreements, represents an important contribution
to global structures and climate-protection aims” (Germany, NC 3, p. 136). Hence, the
prominent terms seem to point to a scale between “sovereignty–seekers” and “integration–
profiteers”.
The β plot of period 2 (subfigure b) also successfully discriminates these two sets of
words, although the distribution is slightly more skewed than for period 1. The words on
the left side refer again to concerns over sovereignty and compromises to deal with climate
change. Peculiar and jeopardize are used in the NCs of parties preoccupied with the spe-
cific characteristics of their own countries and “the absence of specific action that precludes
from making reliable climate projections” (Belize, NC 2, p. 70). By contrast, the words on
the right side are adopted by the countries interested in regime–making and in positioning
themselves “as a world-leading exponent of smart, innovative and business-savvy responses
to environmental issues, leveraging off clean, green images and reputation for business in-
tegrity” (New Zealand, NC 5, p. 152).
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The words highlighted in Figure 8 support the conjecture that the NCs reflect pref-
erences over integration. But what do the words actually say about the unidimensional
positions of these documents? Assuming that the entire climate negotiation agenda can be
described as a unique spectrum of bargaining positions, the Wordfish document estimates
(ω) should confirm that countries cluster into different groups: alarmed countries on one end
(e.g. Madagascar), and regime optimists on the other (e.g. Germany).
Figure 9 shows the plotted distribution of the document parameter ω. Interestingly,
the National Communications turn to be arrayed as the word plots led to suggest: In both
periods countries like Germany and Japan are on the upper bound of the Wordfish document
scale. By contrast, smaller states and OPEC countries (see Madagascar and Nigeria) are
located on the lower bound of the distribution. This fits the interpretation drawn from the
fixed effects plots, holding robust to estimations on text subsamples.13
To ultimately substantiate the meaning of the quantitative analysis of the NC docu-
ments, the literature suggests to cross–validate the quantitative scores with human–coded
positions (Klüver, 2009). I then compare the Wordfish estimates with the manually coded
data. For each bargaining period under consideration, Figure 10 plots the unidimensional
Figure 10: Comparison of Wordfish estimates and factor analysis scores
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estimates obtained with Wordfish (y–axis) and the scores of the factorized data from the
13As a robustness check, I take a look at a subsection of the NC, to address the possibility that different
parts of these long texts may carry different positions and therefore unfold multidimensionality (Slapin and
Proksch, 2008). I select the section called “Policies and measures”, which is supposed to be the chapter
where parties more directly address past and future policies on climate change. The separate analysis on
this subsample does not change the positioning of the national estimates from the analysis on the whole
documents, as shown in the Appendix.
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manual coding (x–axis) with a fitted regression line. The result is a high positive correlation,
where the Pearson coefficients are 0.70 for period 1 and 0.68 for period 2.14 Although they
stem from different gathering processes, the measures overall validate each other. In sum,
the two types of data carry largely similar information regarding climate bargaining positions.
6 Conclusion
Studies on the UN–sponsored climate change negotiations have exponentially increased in
the past years. Still, while these works have enriched the knowledge on cooperation at the
UNFCCC, the literature is still missing inferences based on broad datasets. I here claim
that the little attention paid to spatial measurements and the lack of large–N studies have
hampered ambitious empirical analyses in this field of research. Based on the lessons from
studies of international negotiations in other realms, I present new original data on ideal
positions, outcomes and disagreements at two points in the history of the climate negotia-
tions.15
This paper has presented the systematic process of data collection that generated the
UNFCCC dataset. I first introduced the data sources: the COP agreement texts and the
National Communications. Second, I identified the bargained issues and described the man-
ual data gathering. I then engaged in reliability tests, data reduction modelling and salience
estimation, in order to investigate the data as well as checking the trustworthiness of the
coding. Finally, I moved away from multidimensionality assumptions and made use of quan-
titative text analysis to extract unidimensional ideal points. I thereby applied the Wordfish
algorithm to the National Communications. The results are not only intuitive, but also valid
according to cross–checks with the manual dataset.
The dataset is ultimately meant to foster the explanations of international climate policy
making. The estimates lend themselves to further investigations of success and agreements
at these negotiations. Moreover, these represent useful prior knowledge for case studies of
climate negotiation behaviour across time. These and other investigations will find answers
in this new data.
14The results of the ordinary least squares regressions are (for both periods) R2 = 0.5, β = 0.58, p = .000,
S.E. = 0.07. Note that the significance holds also when dropping outliers (i.e. the most extreme country on
each side of the distributions).
15The data will be made available on the author’s website upon publication.
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